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Complementarity and coordination 
of macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial policies 
to tackle internal and external imbalances
Policy responses to the global crisis have helped stabilise the economies and contained the threat of 
ﬁ  nancial instability. But growing sovereign indebtedness, a weakened ﬁ  nancial system and uneven economic 
growth prospects at the global level pose risks of new imbalances and vulnerabilities. To limit those risks it 
is essential to address both macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial market failures. Important changes in ﬁ  nancial 
market regulation and banking supervision are already being introduced. In the macroeconomic area, 
an effort is being made to strengthen the coordination of economic policies in the context of the G20. 
New institutions, such as macroprudential authorities, are being set up in many countries to monitor and 
contrast the emergence of systemic risk. There are, however, several areas where policy frameworks need 
to be further strengthened. At the international level we need surplus and deﬁ  cit countries to rebalance 
global demand and ensure a return to sustained global growth, without conﬂ  icting policy actions leading 
to potential instability. Effective macroprudential policies require a clear deﬁ  nition of responsibilities, 
and need to be consistent with the conduct of monetary policies. In Europe, more effective economic 
governance is needed to proceed on the route towards greater economic integration and to fortify the 
euro, including tighter rules on ﬁ  scal policies, a broader surveillance over macroeconomic imbalances 
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1| THE RECOVERY 
FROM THE GREAT RECESSION: 
RISKS AND PRIORITIES AHEAD
Until now the economic recovery has been strong in 
emerging countries; weaker than would be required 
to reduce unemployment in the United States; 
uneven and generally sluggish in the euro area.
Policy responses have differed according to 
countries’ cyclical position and policy priorities. 
In advanced economies, monetary policies remain 
accommodative in order to put the recovery on 
a ﬁ  rmer root. However, the expectation of low 
interest rates for a prolonged period could encourage 
excessive risk-taking in ﬁ  nancial markets, creating 
asset price distortions and vulnerabilities. In the years 
preceding the crisis, persistently low global interest 
rates and optimistic expectations of continued 
macroeconomic stability (the “great moderation”) 
led market participants to underestimate risks in 
many asset classes. This helped to create a ﬁ  nancial 
environment conducive to the explosion in private 
debt and the widening of external imbalances. 
A compression of risk and liquidity premia brought 
on by the “search for yield” provided strong 
incentives for ﬁ  nancial institutions to increase 
leverage.1 These phenomena may well reappear as 
economies and ﬁ  nancial systems recover from the 
crisis, unless their underlying causes are addressed. 
Hence the need for central banks to put in place a 
timely and determined monetary policy correction, 
once macroeconomic conditions permit it, and for 
supervisory and regulatory policy to contain the 
accumulation of risks by ﬁ  nancial institutions.
Budgetary policies in Europe are now clearly 
directed at reducing public sector deﬁ  cits and 
containing debt growth; this is not yet the case 
elsewhere. It is essential that governments deliver 
the fiscal adjustments they have committed 
to implement, particularly in those euro area 
countries where concerns over the sustainability 
of public debt are more acute. In perspective, a 
sound ﬁ  scal position is also necessary to meet 
the pressures arising from population ageing. 
In countries where age-related expenditures are 
expected to grow signiﬁ  cantly, reforms of pension, 
health and long-term care systems are urgent. 
Growth-enhancing structural policies can reduce 
the burden of ﬁ  scal adjustment and make it credible.
The situation of international ﬁ  nancial markets 
has clearly improved since the most acute phase 
of the crisis, but strains still remain. In Europe, in 
particular, the interplay between sovereign risk and 
the fragility in parts of the banking sector are still 
creating signiﬁ  cant tensions.
International imbalances, which had temporarily 
narrowed as an effect of the recession, are beginning 
to widen again. Capital ﬂ  ows into some emerging 
markets, driven by interest-rate differentials, are 
putting pressure on exchange rates. Some countries 
are using foreign exchange intervention to resist 
appreciation, in order to support their exports. 
External imbalances are not necessarily bad per se. 
In open economies, it is desirable for saving to be 
invested where it is used the most productively, and 
imbalances can therefore emerge naturally from 
differences in saving behaviour, in rates of return 
on capital, or in the degree of risk or liquidity of 
different assets. However, persistent imbalances 
can be symptoms of underlying distortions if the 
incentives to save and invest and the pricing of risk 
and liquidity are themselves distorted.
An uneven recovery, diverging economic policies, 
protracted low levels of interest rates, risks related 
to the increase of sovereign debts, large imbalances 
in payment systems and pressures on exchange rates 
are all factors that pose a signiﬁ  cant threat to the 
global economy.
In order to effectively tackle these risks and put the 
recovery on safer grounds, action by policy makers 
is necessary in many areas. The rest of the article 
concentrates on three of them. First, the framework 
for international coordination needs to be signiﬁ  cantly 
improved: we now need to strengthen cooperative 
arrangements that could support growth and make 
the global economic and ﬁ  nancial system less prone 
to excesses and crises; this includes the completion 
of the ﬁ  nancial regulatory reform. Second, we need 
to implement well-designed macroprudential policies 
that, together with monetary policies that guarantee 
price stability, contain the emergence of ﬁ  nancial 
imbalances. Third, there is an urgent need for a reform 
of the framework for economic governance in Europe.
1  See, among others, Adrian and Shin (2008) and Brunnermeier (2009).
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2| INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION: 
THE G20 FRAMEWORK
At the 2009 Pittsburgh Summit the G20 pledged to 
work together to ensure a lasting recovery and set the 
world economy on a path of strong and sustainable 
growth over the medium term. To meet this goal, 
the Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced 
Growth has been launched. The backbone of this 
framework is a multilateral process through which 
G20 countries identify objectives for the global 
economy and the policies needed to achieve them. 
The evaluation of the mutual consistency of such 
policies is the objective of the “mutual assessment 
process” (MAP) of their progress towards meeting 
these shared objectives.
In particular, the MAP requires an assessment of 
the nature and the root causes of impediments to 
the adjustment of persistently large imbalances. 
Indicative guidelines composed of a range of 
indicators would serve as a mechanism to facilitate 
the timely identiﬁ  cation of large imbalances that 
require preventive and corrective action.
As agreed by the G20, there must be a shift to a more 
balanced global pattern of demand. In economies 
with substantial external surpluses and large reserve 
positions, policies should aim at fostering private 
demand. In most advanced economies supply-side 
policies and structural reforms ought to enhance 
potential growth. These conclusions follow from 
a hard-won recognition of the inevitability and 
welfare-improving nature of collective action.
Progress is being made, but important policy 
challenges remain in order to meet the objectives of 
strong, sustainable and balanced growth. In particular, 
only limited steps have been taken towards external 
rebalancing. Priority areas include: structural reforms 
and greater exchange-rate ﬂ  exibility to strengthen 
domestic demand in emerging economies; further 
ﬁ  scal consolidation in advanced economies based on 
“growth-friendly” measures; and product and labour 
market reforms across all G20 members to boost 
productive capacity.
Tackling the problem of external imbalances is 
crucial. One may wonder what would have happened 
to the global economy had this rebalancing been 
implemented in due time. Such a counterfactual 
scenario has been studied at the Bank of Italy,2 
focusing on the period 2002-2007. Overall, the 
results of the exercise, obtained simulating a 
global macro-econometric model, highlight the 
complementarities of policy actions in deﬁ  cit and 
surplus countries for the correction of both internal 
and global imbalances. In the simulation period in 
the United States there would have been a slowdown 
in activity, as opposed to the sharp fall observed 
in the last recession. Importantly, housing price 
increases would have been much smaller and closer 
to historical experience, while the improvement in the 
current account balance would have been substantial. 
At a global level, the dispersion of current account 
balances would have remained almost unchanged, 
where in fact it actually doubled.3
Whereas there is no guarantee that the Great Recession 
would have been avoided, the global environment 
would have been much more balanced. As a result, 
the propagation of the crisis would probably have 
been less destructive, because both the US ﬁ  nancial 
system and the global economy would have been 
less vulnerable.
In a global system where external imbalances remain 
large and capital ﬂ  ows may be subject to sudden 
reversal, it is essential to rely on a ﬁ  nancial system 
that is at the same time efﬁ  cient and more robust, 
immune to the perverse incentives that led to the 
accumulation of excessive risk that eventually 
generated the crisis.
Under the aegis of the G20 and through the activity of 
the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and its members, 
the reform of the rules governing the global ﬁ  nancial 
system is taking important steps forward. Our aim 
is to recreate a ﬁ  nancial system with less leverage, 
where transparency allows us to identify and 
manage risks, system-wide prudential and regulatory 
oversight is strengthened and ailing intermediaries 
can fail without disruptions to the rest of the system 
and the real economy.
2 See  Catte  et al. (2010).
3  The dispersion is calculated as the sum of the absolute values of the current account balances in the United States, Japan, Germany and China scaled by world GDP.
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The new Basel rules are a milestone of the reform. 
They introduce a homogeneous definition of 
banks’ capital across countries; they signiﬁ  cantly 
increase both the quality and quantity of 
banks’ capital, thus raising their ability to absorb 
losses; they constrain bank leverage, on- and 
off-the-balance sheet; they introduce new liquidity 
standards, thus reducing liquidity mismatches within 
the system. The new rules are being introduced 
gradually, in order to preserve the capability of the 
banking system to ﬁ  nance the economy.
The second step is to address the risks created by 
systemically important ﬁ  nancial institutions (SIFIs): 
institutions that, because of their dimension, 
complexity and presence in vital parts of the global 
ﬁ  nancial system, if in distress, might endanger the 
entire system and would therefore be bailed out at all 
costs. Last November the G20 approved the proposals 
of the FSB on SIFIs, which are based on four pillars:
i) implementing in every country a resolution 
framework which would enable authorities to resolve 
SIFIs without disruptions to the ﬁ  nancial system 
and without taxpayer support; in order to achieve 
this, we need to modify national legislations with 
the requisite legal and statutory powers and tools to 
transfer businesses or create bridge banks to maintain 
essential ﬁ  nancial services and impose losses on 
creditors. We also need to deﬁ  ne agreements at the 
international level between host and home authorities 
that clearly identify roles and responsibilities in 
resolving an institution;
ii) requiring SIFIs, and initially in particular global 
SIFIs, to have a higher loss absorbency capability 
than non-systemic intermediaries, beyond the 
minimum requirements of Basel III. This could be 
met by introducing an equity capital surcharge, or 
a required level of contingent convertible capital, 
or else a requirement to issue a certain amount of 
“bail-in-able” securities (i.e. debt instruments that 
could suffer losses or be converted into shares in 
situations of distress for the ﬁ  rm). These latter capital 
instruments would also help in disciplining creditors 
and shareholders, hence correcting the moral hazard 
problems posed by the systemic institutions that are 
“too-big-to-fail”.
iii) adopting a more effective and intense supervision 
of SIFIs, commensurate to their size and complexity. 
In many countries this will require an effort to 
strengthen the supervisory authorities’ mandates, 
independence, resources and powers.
iv) improving critical infrastructures, including the 
standardisation of over-the-counter (OTC) derivative 
products as well as their exchange and clearance 
in regulated platforms with central counterparties; 
such measures will help to reduce contagion among 
institutions upon default and will ensure that key 
infrastructures do not themselves pose a systemic threat.
The FSB is also working on another problem that 
emerged from the last crisis: the role and functioning 
of Credit Rating Agencies. The aim is to avoid an 
excessive and mechanical reliance of institutions and 
markets on ofﬁ  cial ratings, in particular by reducing 
their scope in regulation, and to limit in this way the 
most obvious drawbacks of the current system, in 
terms of procyclicality and potentially destabilising 
pressure on the markets.
Finally we need to prevent regulatory arbitrage from 
leading to an accumulation of risks in the “shadow 
banking” sector, that –though hardly hit by the crisis 
and consequent stricter controls– continues to play 
a major role in liquidity transformation and credit 
intermediation. Designing regulatory safeguards to 
address the risks associated with a resurgence of the 
shadow banking activity will be a key priority of the 
FSB’s agenda in the coming years.
We will never be able to avoid all crises. But the 
changes under way will help to signiﬁ  cantly reduce 
their likelihood and scale.
3| MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICIES 
AND THEIR INTERACTION 
WITH MONETARY POLICY
The development of well-designed macroprudential 
policies is another fundamental front that is taking 
shape in the international landscape. New institutions 
are being created around the globe with the 
responsibility of monitoring and limiting ﬁ  nancial 
imbalances and systemic risk. These include 
the IMF-FSB framework for assessing financial 
vulnerabilities at the global level, the constitution 
of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) 
in the United States and of the European Systemic 
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Risk Council (ESRB) in the European Union, as well 
as similar initiatives in other countries. There are a 
number of challenges that need to be addressed by 
policy makers in this area.
A ﬁ  rst important question concerns macroprudential 
policy objectives. The final objective for 
macroprudential policy must be ﬁ  nancial stability. 
However, this objective is hard to measure and proxy. 
Financial crises are infrequent events, can take many 
different forms and may have many different causes. 
All this makes macroprudential policy more difﬁ  cult 
to make operational than, for instance, monetary 
policy, for which we have a clear mandate (price 
stability, inﬂ  ation targets), with relatively precise 
proxies (measures of inﬂ  ation) and instruments 
(short-term interest rates).
Against this background, when shaping the mandate 
for the macroprudential authority, a trade-off emerges 
between clarity and speciﬁ  city, on one side, and 
robustness, on the other. At one extreme we have a 
“broad” deﬁ  nition of objectives, such as reducing the 
likelihood and the severity of ﬁ  nancial crises, as well 
as ensuring the resilience of the ﬁ  nancial system. 
This formulation of the mandate has been chosen 
for the main macroprudential bodies created in the 
aftermath of the crisis, including the ESRB and the 
FSOC. At the other extreme, the objectives could be 
“speciﬁ  c” and contemplate, for instance, “moderating 
the credit cycle”.
A “broad” mandate is all-encompassing and obliges 
the macroprudential policy authority to look at every 
potential source of crisis. At the same time, this very 
feature might make it harder for the authority to 
motivate its actions clearly. Risk warnings or policy 
recommendations based on a certain set of analyses 
could easily be challenged by the addressee on the 
basis of an alternative set of analyses. Furthermore, 
it is not obvious how one may assess compliance 
with this mandate. Financial crises have occurred 
on average every 20 years: it is difﬁ  cult to hold the 
macroprudential policy authority accountable during 
periods in which no ﬁ  nancial crises occur, and so 
measuring its performance can be challenging.
By contrast, a “speciﬁ  c” mandate (e.g. moderating the 
credit cycle) would be relatively simple to deﬁ  ne and 
monitor. Risk warnings or policy recommendations 
based on this type of mandate would be harder to 
challenge, and could trigger more expedite and 
effective action. A “speciﬁ  c” mandate would also 
simplify accountability. However, the ﬂ  ip side of 
the coin is that the macroprudential authority could 
not be held accountable for not acting upon signals 
and events falling outside its mandate: it would be 
difﬁ  cult to blame it if a crisis developed while credit 
growth was subdued, e.g. because credit growth took 
place outside the ofﬁ  cial deﬁ  nition of credit.
Altogether, there are good reasons why the “broad” 
type of mandate was chosen by the ESRB and by 
the FSOC. At the same time, regulators and the 
macroprudential authorities themselves should 
be wary of the risks posed by this formulation in 
the coming years, which shall be crucial for the 
establishment and the success of the new policies.
Similar difﬁ  culties emerge in the deﬁ  nition of the 
appropriate tools for macroprudential policies. 
As systemic ﬁ  nancial risk can emerge from many 
sources, there may be on occasion the need to act 
with very different instruments. This implies that 
in general macroprudential authorities will have 
to act “through” other authorities, for example 
those responsible for micro-prudential, ﬁ  scal or 
other economic policies. At the same time, the 
evidence shows that ﬁ  nancial crises are very often 
associated with large ﬂ  uctuations in credit and 
asset prices. Most analyses, including the Bank 
of Italy’s, indicate that in order to moderate the 
growth of credit and asset prices and reduce the 
likelihood of ﬁ  nancial crises, instruments such 
as countercyclical variations in banks’ capital 
requirements or in loan-to-value ratios may be useful.
This means that instruments of macroprudential 
policies will affect variables that are also affected by 
monetary policy, such as credit supply or loan rates. 
The potential interaction between the two sets of policies 
needs to be well understood and taken into account.
As recently emphasised also by Governor Noyer,4 the 
objectives of macroprudential and monetary policies 
must remain clearly distinct. In particular, the 
crisis has reinforced the case for monetary policy to 
remain ﬁ  rmly focused on maintaining price stability: 
inﬂ  ation expectations have remained well anchored 
throughout the crisis, giving monetary authorities 
the ﬂ  exibility to react strongly to the downturn, also 
with unconventional measures.
4  See Noyer (2010).
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While price stability remains the primary objective, 
it is also a clear lesson from the crisis that monetary 
policy should also be better prepared to counter 
developments in money and credit that can fuel 
the build-up of ﬁ  nancial disequilibria, even in the 
absence of immediate inﬂ  ationary dangers.5 In this 
endeavour monetary policy can receive substantial 
support from macroprudential policies: by reducing 
the pro-cyclicality of credit creation, they can help 
to dampen the economic cycle.
On the other side, coordination failures might 
arise between the macroprudential authority and 
the central bank. In this regard, the key question 
concerns the relationship between the policy interest 
rate and the “new” macroprudential instruments. It is 
necessary to fully understand the macroeconomic 
effects of macroprudential policies. This is the 
case, in particular, if one accepts the view that 
macroprudential tools, such as capital buffers, should 
be steered discretionarily.
The theoretical and empirical analysis of the 
interaction between monetary and macroprudential 
policies is at a very early stage; we must push forward 
a research agenda on these topics. Current research 
at the Bank of Italy indicates that macroprudential 
policies based on countercyclical capital buffers 
or a loan-to-value ratio to smooth ﬂ  uctuations in 
lending may help to dampen output ﬂ  uctuations. 
However, lack of cooperation between monetary 
and macroprudential authorities may create 
the risk of a coordination failure and suboptimal 
macroeconomic results (such as significant 
instability of macroprudential and monetary policy 
instruments).6 These results are due to the fact that 
macroprudential policy and monetary policy affect 
closely related macroeconomic variables but have 
different objectives, so that at times they can push 
in different directions.
In this respect, the new European institutional 
arrangement seems appropriately designed. 
In the European Union, consistency between 
macroprudential and monetary policy will be ensured 
by the composition of the ESRB, where central banks 
play a prominent role. Moreover, the potential 
conﬂ  icts among the two policies will be limited by 
the fact that the tools and actions of macroprudential 
policy will normally be more selective, on a sector 
basis and geographically deﬁ  ned than is the case for 
monetary policy.
4| A  NEW EUROPEAN ECONOMIC 
GOVERNANCE
Recent ﬁ  nancial market turbulence, especially that 
associated with the sovereign debt crisis in some 
euro area countries, has made it painfully clear that the 
economic integration and interdependence created by 
the common currency requires stronger coordination 
of economic policies and an enhanced governance.
Monetary union (EMU) is not in question. There is 
a strong, common interest in preserving the euro, 
which ties together all participating countries –the 
sound ones and those at present in distress. Since 
its inception, the euro has emerged as a strong and 
credible currency in international markets; during 
the crisis it has provided an anchor of stability. 
It represents a crucial step towards greater European 
unity. The process is certainly incomplete and there 
are areas of fragility, some of which came under 
scrutiny because of the crisis. We need to address these 
hardships by moving forward rather than backward.
Policymakers in Europe must now concentrate their 
action on at least three areas:
First, they need to deliver the growth-friendly ﬁ  scal 
adjustments they have committed to implement.
Second, they need to focus on the structural reforms 
that Europe needs in order to boost potential growth; 
current problems in many countries stem as much 
from excessive debt as from the weak economic 
growth expected in the years ahead.
Third, they need to agree on a thorough reform 
of European economic governance. The crisis 
highlighted some major shortcomings. Fiscal rules 
and procedures have proved unable to deliver prudent 
5  It has been pointed out, especially in work at the Bank for International Settlements (see, for example, Borio and Lowe, 2004) that thanks to the success of 
macro-stabilisation policies and to structural changes in the responsiveness of aggregate supply (partly as a result of globalisation), inﬂ  ation expectations are now 
much more ﬁ  rmly anchored, and episodes of excess creation of liquidity and credit tend to be reﬂ  ected primarily in asset price bubbles rather than in consumer 
price inﬂ  ation. Moreover, asset price cycles tend to be associated with large changes in indebtedness and add to ﬁ  nancial vulnerabilities, thus posing signiﬁ  cant 
risks for macroeconomic stability in the medium to longer run (Visco, 2009).
6   See Angelini, Neri and Panetta (2010). Similar results are obtained by Bean et al. (2010).
FSR15_43_52_Italie.indd   48 FSR15_43_52_Italie.indd   48 04/02/2011   16:18:18 04/02/2011   16:18:18Global imbalances and ﬁ  nancial stability
Banque de France ￿ Financial Stability Review ￿ No. 15 ￿ February 2011  49
Complementarity and coordination of macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial policies to tackle internal and external imbalances
Mario Draghi
policies: many member states entered the crisis 
with an already high public debt and insufﬁ  cient 
margins of manoeuvre; in the case of Greece, the 
surveillance did not even guarantee the use of proper 
accounting and sound statistical standards. Moreover, 
macroeconomic imbalances were not given an 
adequate role in the design of EMU governance: 
tensions hit not only countries with problems of 
public ﬁ  nances, but also those with a high external 
deﬁ  cit, unbalanced growth and/or a highly indebted 
private sector. Finally, an appropriate framework to 
safeguard the ﬁ  nancial stability of the euro area in 
crisis situations was missing altogether.
Reform proposals have been set out in all the 
three areas by the European Commission and the 
Task Force chaired by President Van Rompuy.
Concerning ﬁ  scal surveillance, the Report of the 
Task Force states that “the debt criterion … should 
be made operational to be effectively applied”. 
This proposal is clearly welcome. It is well known 
that, while the Maastricht Treaty requires countries 
with high public debt to reduce it “at a satisfactory 
pace”, this provision has never been effectively 
implemented. The Report also envisages a wider 
range of sanctions, both ﬁ  nancial and political, to be 
applied progressively, starting at an early stage in the 
budgetary surveillance process, in order to strengthen 
the incentives to comply with the rules in good times. 
However, the procedures remain too lengthy and 
largely determined by discretionary decisions of the 
European Council. This is the fundamental problem of 
multilateral surveillance as it is currently conceived. 
There is no independent enforcer of EU rules: the 
supervisors are the supervised themselves.
With regard to the surveillance of macroeconomic 
imbalances, the Task Force proposes an alert 
mechanism, based on the analysis of macroeconomic 
and competitiveness developments, and an 
enforcement mechanism that includes sanctions if 
a country in “excessive imbalance position” does not 
comply with the Council’s recommendations. As the 
crisis showed, macroeconomic imbalances may 
lead to unsustainable development and dangerous 
spillovers to other countries.7 However, designing 
and implementing effective control in this area 
presents several challenges. First, timely detection 
of macroeconomic imbalances may be problematic; 
second, identifying and reaching a consensus on the 
appropriate policies to tackle structural problems 
is not simple, to say the least. To avoid long and 
unproductive negotiations between the Council, the 
Commission and the country under examination, we 
need transparent procedures, a clear commitment 
on the part of member states and a clear focus on 
a limited number of indicators, the ones directly 
related to threats to ﬁ  nancial stability. In this area, 
I expect that the ESRB will provide a signiﬁ  cant 
contribution to the analysis and prevention of some 
of the major imbalances.
Finally, it is important that the euro area endows itself 
with a framework capable of addressing ﬁ  nancial 
distress and avoiding contagion. The consequences 
of the absence of a well-deﬁ  ned crisis resolution 
mechanism clearly emerged last spring with the 
Greek crisis: the uncertainty increased the costs 
of finance for virtually all member countries, 
including those providing ﬁ  nancial support. A crisis 
management framework has to be designed so 
as to ensure appropriate incentives for countries 
applying for ﬁ  nancial support and for private credit 
markets, in order to limit moral hazard. At the end of 
November 2010, the Eurogroup agreed on the main 
features of a crisis management framework aimed at 
safeguarding the ﬁ  nancial stability of the euro area 
as a whole. In particular, it has (i) stressed that 
assistance will be based on a stringent programme 
of economic and ﬁ  scal adjustment and on a rigorous 
debt sustainability analysis; (ii) clariﬁ  ed that the 
mechanism does not represent an unconditional 
bailing out and that there is always a possibility that 
private creditors may incur losses if the country 
concerned does not succeed in implementing the 
necessary adjustment.
These proposals move in the right direction. However, 
many important issues have yet to be settled. This is a 
classic case of “the devil being in the details”. It is only 
with a clear manifestation of cooperation, solidarity 
and steadiness that the European community and 
the euro will be fortiﬁ  ed.
7   See, for example, Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010).
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Policy responses to the global crisis have helped stabilise conﬁ  dence and limit the threat of ﬁ  nancial 
instability. Countries acted together at the peak of the crisis. Yet, despite announcements about the 
importance of coordination, subsequently they resorted to policies that appear to have an essentially 
national focus. Strengthening multilateral coordination to mitigate global distortions remains a priority. 
In fact, the large accumulation of public debt and a protracted situation of abundant liquidity now carry 
the risk of creating new imbalances and vulnerabilities.
It is equally essential to proceed decisively with the reforms of ﬁ  nancial regulation and supervision already 
drafted by the Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee. These reforms will make ﬁ  nancial 
systems both more resilient and less pro-cyclical and will correct the incentive distortions that played an 
important role in this crisis.
In general, this approach suggests striving for greater global governance. Global problems, after all, 
require global solutions, which calls for an important role for international organisations like the IMF and 
global forums such as the G20, alongside stricter international codes and standards.
In Europe, countries have responded to the crisis both individually, with ﬁ  scal policy measures designed 
to contain sovereign risk and prevent contagion, and collectively, with new institutions and rules. 
This process is not yet complete. Countries with the weakest public institutions were not in a position to 
overcome their economic policy difﬁ  culties on their own. With European rules that are quasi-automatic, 
fast-acting and sensitive to market signals, they can draw on the stronger countries for the determination 
they themselves lacked.
A monetary policy that ensures medium-term price stability and a stronger framework for controlling public 
deﬁ  cits are fundamental. Restoring economic growth is equally essential for maintaining ﬁ  nancial stability. 
This is the front on which the Union’s cohesion will be tested: the ability to foster harmonious, sustained 
growth for all the member states, with common rules which, like those governing public ﬁ  nances, will 
provide help to those countries lagging behind in undertaking the needed structural reforms.
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